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Abstract 
Ownership is determined by firm specific factors and the environment. Firms change over their life-
cycle. The governance cycle – here defined as changes in identity of the dominant owner and own-
ership concentration - is marked by key phases including start-up, growth, and possibly a restructur-
ing or exit stage. During transition the cycle reflects: privatization often with a high proportion of 
employee ownership like in Russia and in Slovenia; strong pressures for restructuring and owner-
ship changes; limited possibility for external finance because of embryonic development of the fi-
nancial system. To provide simple hypothesis tests, we use Russian enterprise data for 1995-2003 
and Slovenian data covering 1998-2003. In spite of differences in institutional development, con-
cerning privatization and development of corporate governance institutions, we find that govern-
ance cycles are broadly similar in the two countries. Employee ownership is rapidly fading, but 
while change to manager and non-financial domestic outsider ownership is typical for Russia, man-
ager ownership is not widespread in Slovenia. Instead change to financial outsiders in the form of 
Privatization Investment Funds is frequent. Foreign ownership, which is rare especially in Russia, is 
quite stable. The ownership diversification to employees and diversified external owners during 
privatization did not fit well to the low development of institutions. As expected we observe in both 
countries a subsequent concentration of ownership on managers, external domestic and foreign 
owners.  
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I. Introduction 
The identity of the owners and the concentration of ownership are key elements of the gov-
ernance structure of enterprises. In the developed market economies these elements follow certain 
patterns of change over the life-cycle of the company, but at the same time with strong influence 
from the institutional framework in the specific country. In Eastern Europe these institutions have 
been changing very fast and in combination with the privatization process we have seen very fast 
changes in ownership and therefore a special pattern of governance cycles in these countries in tran-
sition. This has been studied for the three Baltic countries in Jones and Mygind, 2004.  However, it 
would be interesting to contrast the change in ownership structures in two countries with quite dif-
ferent processes of privatization and large differences in the development of the new market institu-
tions. Russia and Slovenia constitutes such a contrast. They are in fact on each side of what Berglof 
and Bolton (2002) call: “The great Divide” between countries, including Slovenia, which estab-
lished a sound institutional foundation and those that did not, including Russia at that time. 
 In the following section we will first present the theoretical framework behind the 
governance cycle in developed market economies and the predictions about a special pattern of 
governance cycles in economies in transition. In section 3 we describe the differences in the transi-
tion process and developments in the institutional environment in Russia and Slovenia. Section 4 
outlines the data, reviews previous work on ownership changes in transition economies, and present 
the results of the analysis on ownership dynamics and concentration for Russia and Slovenia in 
transition matrices and in econometric analyses. The final section includes conclusions and implica-
tions. 
 
II. A special governance cycle during transition? 
The theoretical starting point is that the choice of governance structure is determined by: en-
terprise characteristics: size, need of capital, information asymmetries, etc. as well as surrounding 
institutions, market conditions etc. The enterprise characteristics change over the life cycle of the 
firm. Ownership structures are expected to change because different stakeholder groups can con-
tribute in different ways to the development of the company at different times in the firm’s devel-
opment. This means a change in governance structure over the life cycle - a specific governance 
cycle. However, the surroundings differ between countries, and countries in transition have specific 
features and specific paths of development. Therefore, we can identify a specific governance cycle 
during transition. Because of the rapid changing environment corporate governance patterns estab-
lished at early stages of transition can be expected to change quite fast. But the speed of transition, 
the institutional framework, and the needs of capital and other inputs from different stakeholders 
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vary across countries and are expected to produce differences in the nature of the typical life cycle 
across countries - for example in the speed at which particular ownership changes will occur.  
The ownership structure in market economies is determined by enterprise level factors and a 
combination of institutional, cultural and economic factors. To the extent that there is a possibility 
for ownership structures to adjust it can be assumed that, given the institutional setting, the type of 
ownership that gives the highest return to the owners will prevail. The optimal ownership structure 
can be explained from several perspectives including agency-, property rights-, transaction cost- 
and resource dependence approaches (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Williamson 1985, Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978). Based on this eclectic theoretical approach we can identify explanatory elements 
behind the ownership dynamics. We will start with the most important elements at the company 
level. The main conclusions are summarized in table 1: 
The size and capital demands of the company may be very high even in relation to a wealthy 
owner. Therefore, growth is associated with a more diversified ownership structure, a fall in owner 
concentration (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Putterman 1993, Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Especially 
for wealth-constrained insiders, ownership of a high capital demanding company means a high con-
centration of risk. Insiders put all their eggs, jobs and capital, into one basket (Meade, 1972). There 
is a trade off between single proprietorship by the manager with no governance problem between 
manager and owners and the possibility of diversification and higher capital supply by external 
more diversified investors with less control with management (Fama and Jensen 1985). The speci-
ficity of the different inputs constitutes another microeconomic factor. If the fixed assets can be used 
in many alternative activities it is much easier to finance them by loans instead of by direct risk 
capital. In these cases banks will play a strong role (Williamson 1985). The larger the need for di-
rect risk capital, the less likelihood that a single provider of capital will emerge to fulfill these needs 
and more diversified ownership can be expected (Fama and Jensen 1985, Putterman 1993). The ex-
istence of specific capital means a higher dependence on other links in the value chain. The hold-up 
problem may lead to a stronger connection to core suppliers or customers with quite concentrated 
strategic ownership of the company (Grossman and Hart, 1986). A special relation concerns the in-
puts of human capital. If it is highly specific, the risk is high for the employees. To limit this risk, 
the employees have an incentive to take direct control and ownership of the enterprise. A large size 
of the company is often used as an explanation for no employee ownership because of the need for 
a central monitor to avoid shirking (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972) and the larger the group the 
smaller is each employee’s share in the ownership rights and the easier it is for a single employee to 
free-ride. Hansmann (1996) argues that a larger group of employees combined with higher hetero-
geneity means higher costs for collective decision making. 
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 Transaction costs for outside investors are also closely connected to the specificity of the 
assets of the company, information asymmetries, and of the institutional framework (see below.) 
New and yet unproven business ideas with complex human capital make it very difficult and costly 
for external investors, including both passive suppliers of capital like banks and active external 
owners to get reliable information about the company and to monitor the performance of managers. 
 The economic performance of the firm is another potential influence on the ownership type 
with, for example, an economic crisis often implying a shift in ownership. However, this ownership 
change may take several directions: An outside raider or a strategic investor related to the value 
chain may take over the company and perform the necessary restructuring. A managerial buy-out 
may be the result if, based on insider information, the managers estimate the value of the firm to be 
higher than estimates of external investors (Wright et al., 2001). If the value of the company is high 
insiders may have a strong temptation to sell their shares (Miyazaki, 1984), while an economic cri-
sis may induce a defensive take-over by the employees to introduce more flexible wages and to 
save their jobs and their specific human capital. (Ben-Ner and Yun 1996). In this case low wage 
would be connected to employee ownership. On the other hand does low wage signal low educa-
tional level, low human capital, which point in the opposite direction of employee ownership. 
  
             Based on these influences on and determinants of ownership some trends in the develop-
ment of a typical ownership structure for a firm can be noted in relation to the typical life-cycle of 
the firm, see table 2. Over its life-cycle, a company will change technology, markets and relations to 
the different stakeholders. These shifts influence the role of different stakeholders including the 
identity of the dominant owners. Most companies start-up as small entities with few employees, 
low capital, and low knowledge about the economic potential of the firm. A high proportion fail in 
the early stage; but most of the succeeding companies go into a stage of growth, which demands 
higher inputs of capital, knowledge, networks and employees. The need for extra capital may even-
tually lead to some diversification of ownership. However, a specific shock in the environment may 
also lead the company into a stage of crisis, which makes some kind of new inputs necessary. This 
will often be a new input of capital, which can be facilitated through an ownership change. During 
these stages the change in ownership can be related to the different determinants of the ownership 
structure. Changing conditions both from within and from outside the company generate changes in 
ownership and hence changes in the development of the governance cycle, see table 2. 
 The classic entrepreneurial company starts up as a small entity with relatively low capital 
inputs, which can be covered by the entrepreneur and by debt based on personal loans e.g. with col-
lateral in the family-house. Information about the core-competence, the yet unproven business idea, 
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is difficult to transmit to an external investor. The asymmetry in information between the insider 
and external investor is very large and the transaction costs of writing and controlling a contract are 
very high. High uncertainty and lack of reliable information about the prospects of the new business 
and its market potential enhance the problem of asymmetric information and risks to the external 
investor. Therefore, most new companies are started by single proprietors, and owned by the entre-
preneur sometimes with participation of close relatives and friends. The capital needed can in most 
cases be covered by the founders and by loans with collateral in the entrepreneurs’ personal assets.   
 Many small entrepreneurial companies close down during the initial stages, but eventually, 
those that survive enter an initial growth stage. The company needs high capital investments, 
knowledge and networks to facilitate high growth to benefit from economies of scale. At the same 
time, the firm starts to create some reputation and market-experience, which can improve the in-
formation and give guarantees for potential external investors. Suppliers of capital, banks or other 
financial institutions will in most cases not claim direct control, but often they require to closely 
monitor the collateral behind the loan. In some cases the owner may get new capital by issuing ex-
tra shares to new owners found within a rather closed circle of stakeholders, typically top-
employees of the company, investors from the local society or close business partners.  
 At a later more mature growth stage, when the company has developed its potential, it may 
attract a strategic investor with an interest in including the company in its value-chain. Another pos-
sibility for attracting capital at a developed stage is to go public. The development of going public 
is also often part of a process of diversification of ownership. Therefore, the process of growth is 
often combined with a lower degree of concentration.  
 Sooner or later many companies run into a stage of crisis. Diverse internal and external fac-
tors, including changes in technology and/or markets or the institutional setting, force the company 
to adjust to the new conditions. The company faces strong pressures to undertake restructuring. 
New external capital and expertise are needed, and banks, venture capital and strategic investors 
may play an important role. As an alternative to closure insiders may make a defensive takeover to 
protect their jobs and their specific human capital. The crisis may also result in an exit of the com-
pany and liquidation of the assets, which is then taken over by new investors for other activities. 
  
 The determinants behind the ownership structure and the governance cycle are not only 
found within the company. The economic institutional and cultural environment is important and 
variations across countries explain differences in governance systems and ownership dynamics.  
Macroeconomic cycles have an impact on the performance of companies and therefore on 
the governance structure. MBOs are more frequent in business cycle troughs because of low pricing 
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of assets during dips. This can be seen in relation to tendencies of going private (Wright et al, 2001) 
while boom periods on the stock market means that IPOs and going public give companies a 
cheaper possibility for raising external finance. Defensive employee takeovers can be assumed to be 
more frequent in recessions because of higher threats of closure and lower alternative employment 
possibilities (Ben-Ner 1988). 
 The institutional setting in relation to legislation may present specific barriers or provide 
advantages to different forms of ownership. The degree of protection of minority owners through 
legislation and the liquidity and development of the stock markets have impact on the diversifica-
tion of ownership. Thus, concentrated ownership is widespread in countries with a lower degree of 
minority owner protection and less developed capital markets, while diversified ownership is more 
frequent in countries such as US and UK with highly developed capital markets and a high degree 
of protection of minority owners (La Porta et al 1999, Becht et al 2002). Also, the development of 
the banking sector enhances the possibility of financing growth through bank-loans, and for the role 
of the banks as creditors and potential owners in the governance structure of the firm.  
Informal social relations and culture, defined as the historical traditions, cultural values, 
norms and preferences of the stakeholders, can also explain important differences in the governance 
structure between countries. Thus, the optimal ownership structure in Russia is expected to be dif-
ferent from the optimal structure in the Slovenia because stakeholders have different objectives and 
different relations to each other, and the historical experience of participation, local initiative versus 
paternalistic leadership styles and centralization are part of the path-dependency of the dynamics on 
both the macro and the enterprise level.  
 
         The transitional economies are characterized by a specific economical and institutional devel-
opment and therefore we expect that a specific governance cycle exists in firms in those countries. 
The dynamics of enterprise governance and ownership are quite distinct because enterprises go 
through both a transition in ownership structure, a transition in relation to the changing institutions 
in the environment, and a transition of the market in relation to prices, costs, and competitive struc-
ture with a strong pressure for restructuring of products and production methods. Most enterprises 
in transition economies start with rapidly changing the structure of governance combined with a 
strong pressure for restructuring production simply to be able to survive. The specific elements in 
early transition that influence the governance cycle are shown in Table 3. 
To understand the governance cycles appearing in transitional economies there are three 
special conditions that must be taken into account. First of these factors is the privatization process, 
which in the early years of transition created specific conditions for the initial development of pri-
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vate ownership. The different methods favored different types of owners.  In some countries em-
ployees had a strong political position resulting in a very high frequency of employee ownership. 
Often managers had a strong position in relation to the political system. On the other hand, voucher 
privatization supported a high degree of domestic external ownership, while direct sale without re-
strictions for foreign capital gave foreign investors the lead in the change to concentrated external 
ownership (Mygind 2001). Privatization is a state governed process where the specific methods cre-
ate a specific ownership structure, which would not have developed in a more market based system 
for ownership adjustments. The path-dependency may create a learning process and institutional 
development, which may lead to specific paths for subsequent developments in the governance 
structure. Such path dependencies can to a high degree be used for explaining persistent differences 
in the governance structure in the West (Roe 1990). On the other hand, it is expected that there will 
be post-privatization adjustments bringing the ownership structure back to a “normal” equilibrium. 
 A second condition occurs because, from the start of transition, nearly all state owned enter-
prises are confronted with a strong pressure for restructuring of production, production methods, 
organizational structure and markets. They are in a situation of crisis with an acute need of capital, 
new skills, and new networks. In the developed market economies this often leads to a change in 
ownership bringing new investors with the necessary resources for restructuring. In some cases, pri-
vatization delivers the best-fit investor for restructuring. In other cases post privatization dynamics 
include a takeover to facilitate such restructuring.  
 The third and most important feature of transition delays this ownership adjustment. This 
concerns the long lasting process of building up institutions for a well-functioning market economy 
including institutions required to facilitate the adjustment of enterprise governance. In the early 
transition, lack of developed institutions favors special types of ownership. Insiders have an advan-
tage in relation to outside owners because the institutions supporting outside ownership such as 
credible auditing procedures and transparent stock markets are not developed (Mygind 2001).  
Based on these three special conditions hypotheses about the specific governance cycle in 
transition can be developed (table 4). However, since some conditions give tendencies whose direc-
tions are ambiguous, the final conclusions must be based on empirical analysis. 
 The first set of hypotheses concerns the scope and resilience of employee ownership. Priva-
tization in many countries, including Russia and Slovenia, led to a high degree of employee owner-
ship. However, employees’ lack of governance skills, their lack of capital and the risk-concentration 
may lead to a tendency to rapid sale to other investors. High number of employees, high capital in-
tensity, and low wage could strengthen this tendency. But the movement away from employee own-
ership could be delayed by various factors:  The employees may in the past or in the transition pro-
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cesses have acquired governance skills; there may be strong defensive arguments for keeping own-
ership to protect employment (Blanchard and Aghion 1996); or the specific company may have a 
high degree of specific human capital, which would be threatened by a sale to another investor.  
 The lack of development of the institutional environment weakens the role of external inves-
tors. The lack of transparency and high risk especially in the early stages of transition combined 
with the lack of markets for company shares means that, in general, managers have a strong advan-
tage compared to external investors (Kalmi 2002). Therefore, especially during the early stages of 
transition, it can be expected that managers take over the shares that employees want to sell. 
 Voucher-privatization provides for a high degree of public offering of shares to diversified 
external owners. This often means overly diversified ownership in relation to the volatility of the 
markets, the low quality of information to external owners, and the lack of development of the insti-
tutional framework. Most of these initial small external shareholders are under strong wealth con-
straints. Therefore, during the early years these companies are in a process of concentration of own-
ership in the hands of especially managers and small groups of external investors who have accu-
mulated wealth in the early transition.  
When the institutional framework becomes more advanced during the process of transition it 
can be expected that external investors get a stronger position, and there will be shifts from insider 
to outsider ownership. This tendency is strengthened if the company, either because of high growth 
or because of pressure for restructuring, has a strong need for extra capital.  
 The stock markets in transitional countries are weak, with few companies listed, low capi-
talization, low turnover and few IPOs. Therefore, it is too early to observe the tendency found in the 
west for more mature firms to diversify ownership to small external investors. Instead we expect a 
tendency in direction of higher concentration also when we look at continued external ownership. 
 Foreign ownership is established both as new green-field entities, as takeovers directly in 
the privatization process, or as takeovers in the post-privatization adjustment process. In these cases 
we expect a rather stable ownership structure because these enterprises have reached their final 
stage of development in the ownership cycle at least within the relatively short time-horizon of our 
analysis.  
 
 The specific governance cycle during transition can be understood as a sequence where 
three types of governance problems are in focus: The stakeholder problem related to the representa-
tion of the interests of different groups of stakeholders; the manager-owner problem, which is the 
usual agency problems between the manager as agent for the owner as principal; and finally the 
problem between a dominant core-owner and the minority owners. In transitional countries the 
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starting point can be understood as a stakeholder system with the state representing the social inter-
est. Privatization models where ownership is transferred to the employees address one of the most 
important stakeholder problems – the relations to the firms’ employees.  
With the change to manager ownership the focus shifts to solve the manager-owner prob-
lem. The clear-cut solution to this problem is simply to unite the position as manager and owner. 
When there are too weak possibilities in the governance system for the owners to control the man-
agers, as is often the case in early transition, insider- and especially manager ownership may be the 
solution on the owner-manager governance problem.  
With the development of governance institutions outsider ownership becomes feasible, but it 
is necessary to have a strong concentrated owner to minimize the owner-manager problem. As a 
trade-off the majority-minority owner problem comes into focus because the governance institu-
tions are still not so developed that minority owners are protected. With the development of institu-
tions securing disclosure and transparency, and rules protecting minority shareholder interests 
against dilution of shares, and other forms of appropriation of rights by majority shareholder it be-
comes possible to limit this governance problem to such an extent that a governance system based 
on diversified small shareholders may develop.  
In this way the focus changes from the stakeholder problem over the manager-owner prob-
lem to the minority problem as the economy passes through different institutional stages.  
Also in advanced economies there can be a trade-off between the different problems so the 
solution of the manager-owner problem increases the majority-minority problem, or the solution of 
the stakeholder problem means that the manager extends his power as “representative of the differ-
ent stakeholders” on the expense of shareholders. In the most advanced corporate governance sys-
tems all three problems are targeted simultaneously. The stakeholder problem is addressed e.g. in 
the form of Corporate Social Responsibility and/or employee representation in the company board. 
 
The analysis has emphasized some general tendencies for the governance cycle in transi-
tional countries in comparison to Western countries. However, the existence of cross national dif-
ferences, especially concerning institutional differences related to the speed and form of transition, 
may make both the starting points and the speed of change between different phases of the cycle 
different across the transitional countries. The dominant form of privatization determine to what 
degree the starting point of the cycle for privatized firms will be employee ownership, management 
ownership or perhaps other groups with strong connections to the state have been favored (Mygind 
2001). The specific rules for privatization may include restrictions for later ownership changes. 
Some shares may not be transferable for a certain period and some forms of institutional ownership 
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by pension- and other investment-funds may set a path for low flexibility in the ownership struc-
ture.  
In addition to the specific privatization methods the institutional development and the gen-
eral economic and political stability determine the level of foreign investment (Bevan et. al. 2004). 
The speed of ownership change also depends on the transition of institutions. The development of 
the banking sector and the possibility of debt financing are especially important. The dynamics also 
depend on the development of the capital-market and the possibility of expanding the equity both 
for listed companies and for trading shares of non-listed companies. The protection of the rights of 
the shareholders, especially minority owners, is important for diversification versus concentration 
of ownership in the post-privatization period.  
It is not only the specific privatization methods and the development of institutions that 
make ownership dynamics in one country different from another. The economic development and 
the degree and duration of the initial fall in production and possible later reversals like the 1998 cri-
sis in Russia can influence the governance cycle in several ways. The steep fall in income of the 
population may put a strong pressure on liquidity-strained employee owners and low-income own-
ers of vouchers or shares. They will sell and concentration will increase. On the other hand, high 
risk of unemployment may increase the defensive motive of employees to keep their shares and sus-
tain control over their jobs to secure their specific human capital. 
Finally, cultural factors and historical experience of management style, employees partici-
pation in ownership and control over the enterprises, and attitudes of risk-taking and involvement 
may play a role both for the sustainability of employee ownership and for the development of a 
broader shareholder-culture with diversified ownership.  
In the next section we look at specific developments in Russia and Slovenia and develop 
hypotheses for how this can be expected to affect the corporate governance cycles, especially the 
starting points and the speed and direction of ownership change in these two countries. 
 
III.  Privatization and Governance Institutions in Russia and Slovenia 
 Some economic indicators for Russia and Slovenia are summarized in table 5 and the results 
of privatization in the two countries are summarized in table 6.  
 The background for privatization in Russia was several generations of centralized planning 
with limited scope for each enterprise. The management style was paternalistic with a low degree of 
active participation of the employees in the governance of the companies. There were several waves 
of reforms to increase the efficiency of the system, but these reforms did not succeed in fundamen-
tal changing the system before Gorbatjov started to make market-oriented reforms. His Perestrojka 
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policy included in the end of the 1980es the possibility to start small individual private firms, the 
possibility for starting new cooperatives with formal ownership by the employees, and possibilities 
for the collective of workers to lease the enterprise. The incidence of the lease-buyout scheme was 
particularly large in retail trade, consumer services, and in light industry. By February 1992, 9451 
state enterprises accounting for 8 % of total employment were leased by their workers and manag-
ers, (Blasi et al 1997). The new cooperatives, individual firms and the leasing system were privati-
zation processes starting up already in the time of the former Soviet Union. With the democratiza-
tion process and the increasing power of the reform-wing in the different republics more wide-scale 
privatization plans were formulated e.g. in the Baltic countries and in the republic of Russia.  
However, privatization in Russia did not take off before after the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union in 1991. Privatization of small entities was done quite fast, mostly during 1992 and 1993. 
The specific method mainly based on auctions and tenders varied between regions. Mass privatiza-
tion directed toward medium and large enterprises started in the fall 1992. Vouchers distributed to 
the whole population could be used for buying shares in the enterprises. The companies could chose 
between different models: Option 1: 25 % non-voting shares were offered to employees for free, 
with the option to buy a further 10 % of ordinary shares at a 30 % discount of the book value of 
January 1992 – already much below the market value by the time of privatization. Managers were 
offered to purchase 5 % of ordinary shares at nominal price. Option 2: Employees could for cash or 
vouchers buy 51 % of ordinary shares at 1.7 times the 1992 book value, again much lower than the 
market value. For implementation at least 2/3 of the employee should support this model. Option 3: 
A managing group could buy 30 % of voting shares. Further 20 % could be purchased by insiders at 
30 % discount., given the rapid inflation in Russia at that time, the prices to pay in all three options 
were so low, that the mass privatization really was a give-away  (Hare and Muravyev, 2002). 
The privatization was very rapid. Of the 24,000 medium and large enterprises, most had 
been corporatized and over 15,000 privatized by the end of 1994. Over 70 % of the firms offered 
for privatization chose option 2. Option 1 was chosen by 21 % giving insiders control of most en-
terprises. In combination with the paternalistic ownership style it meant that managers consolidated 
their positions. However, the incidence of employee ownership was much smaller in well-
performing, capital-intensive, large enterprises. Here insiders were unable to accumulate enough 
funds to buy 51 % of shares under option 2, and most of these firms followed option 1 with a 
weaker position for insiders (Hare and Muravyev, 2002). 
Foreign involvement was negligible. Investment funds collected some of the shares, owned 
by small external shareholders, but in general these funds played a minor role.   
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Many of the large jewels of Russian industry like the metal company: Norilsk Nickel and 
the oil-companies: Sibneft, Sidanco and some shares in Lukoil were privatized through the “loans 
for shares” or “mortgage” privatization in 1995. This system was direct, non-competitive sales of 
blocks of shares at low prices to the leading Financial-Industrial Groups, which at the same time 
administered the process (IET, 1997). In the following years case-by-case privatizations of a few 
large enterprises and leftover state holdings were performed with increasing speed and transpar-
ency.  
In Russia there have been severe problems for the financial sector and its functions of chan-
neling capital to the enterprises and to be part of the governance system by disciplining the efficient 
use of these capital inputs. Before August 1998 the banks made more money from lending to the 
government or through their foreign transactions than from lending to business. Interest rates were 
extremely high and firms did not invest at all these years or they based investment on internally cre-
ated resources. Since the 1998 financial crisis, the banking sector remains underdeveloped and con-
sists of over 1000 banks, most of which are small and undercapitalized except for the large and 
completely dominating state-controlled Sberbank.  
Similarly to the banking sector, the Russian stock market has never played an important role 
in providing enterprises with financial resources. The number of listed equities is about 250 of 
which only around 60 were regularly traded in 2003. Out of these 57 had American Depository Re-
ceipts quotation in New York (Buck 2003). Most equities are illiquid. While the market capitaliza-
tion of several individual companies amounts to billions of dollars and capitalization of the Russian 
stock market is in the start of 2004 approaching 200 billion US$. The turnover on the main Moscow 
stock exchange is about 100-120 million USD per week. 
When looking at the governance institutions in transitional countries it is important not to 
focus on the legal framework, which may be quite advanced, but to look at the actual implementa-
tion of shareholders rights, protection of minority owners, and the quality of information and dis-
closure. Therefore, we will not give a detailed description of the complex of governance legislation 
and codes, but indicate the level and the main tendencies in the development. 
Because of lack of legislation, regulation and enforcement the early 1990es were in Russia 
characterized by a very strong position of management often allied with a few strong external in-
vestors. In these days most of the powerful financial industrial groups such as Menater, Onexim, 
Inkombank and Alfa were created. Managers and their allies appropriated rights from employees 
and diversified external owners, and through widespread tunneling large fortunes were accumulated 
and concentrated in the hands of relatively few people. In the mid 1990es the legislation on compa-
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nies and securities market developed, but lack of trained officials and widespread corruption meant 
that enforcement was quite weak (Puffer and McCarthy 2003).  
The legislation and enforcement in relation to disclosure, transparency and protection of mi-
nority owners were strengthened somewhat in the new millennium with stronger state policies and 
with the start of the process for Russian accession to WTO. The Russian Federal Commission for 
the Securities Markets unveiled in 2002 a Code of Corporate Conduct, which is in line with the 
OECD Principles for good corporate governance. However, the code is voluntary, and it remains to 
be seen if the Commission will strengthen it activities as a watchdog. In the past investigations have 
been very rare. The new millennium also saw an increasing number of large companies improving 
their corporate governance systems with higher standard of disclosure, accountability, and protec-
tion of minority owners. In general, the development since 2001 has improved both regulation and 
enforcement. From a regime characterized by widespread abuses, the Russian companies have in 
the new millennium started to develop into a stage where corporate governance issues are taken se-
riously. (Puffer and McCarthy 2003). Cases where foreign investors take active part in governance 
and actually take over controlling positions in large Russia enterprises are still very rare with BPs’ 
takeover of a strong position in the oil company Sidanco as an important exception. 
Bankruptcy is part of the governance mechanism for adjusting ownership. Therefore, bank-
ruptcy legislation and enforcement is important for the development of the governance cycle. The 
Russian development in this field has followed the general pattern of other Russian governance in-
stitutions with very weak legislation and enforcement in the 1990es, but then followed by some im-
provements in the new millennium. The number of bankruptcies was extremely low during most of 
the 1990es. However, in January 1998 the amended Law on bankruptcies was enacted. This pro-
voked a sharp jump in the number of bankruptcies. The number of bankruptcy petitions, which were 
accepted by courts and were in the process of implementation were only 4.200 at the end 1997, but 
increased to 10.200 in 1998, 15.200 in 1999 and 27.000 at the end of 2000. Actually, bankruptcies 
were often used as a cheap method of hostile takeovers or asset stripping. In order to optimize tax 
payments many companies created special "profit centers" that accumulated revenues while enter-
prises per se (production entities) were transformed into "liabilities centers" (via transfer pricing 
etc). So a raider who succeeded in buying enterprise debts might submit a petition on its bankruptcy 
and easily become its new owner. The paradox is that the best performing enterprises became vic-
tims of these raiders. In 2003 the Law on bankruptcy was amended to stop this wave of false bank-
ruptcies. 
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The economic development can also influence the identity of ownership and thus the dy-
namics over the governance cycle. From the economic indicators in table 5 it is clear that Russia 
had a much steeper fall in production than it was the case for Slovenia. Russian production did not 
start to grow before 1997, and then followed the financial crisis, which in 1998 had a negative ef-
fect on production. However, in the following years production increased rapidly because of favor-
able oil-prices and strong import-substitution after the steep devaluation of the Ruble in the months 
following the crisis. Unemployment did not increase so much as the fall in production up to 1997 
should indicate, because most Russian enterprises tended to keep the employees although they pro-
duced below their capacity-level. Instead wages were kept on a very low level. Wages measured in 
USD fell steeply following the crisis in 1998, but then recovered in the following growth period. 
Table 5 also indicates the extremely low FDI going into Russia. 
 
Slovenia’s economic development has been quite different from the situation in Russia. The 
initial fall in production was quite fast turned around to steady growth. The relatively high level of 
productivity and competitiveness, which characterized the Slovenian self-management economy 
since the 1960es, meant that the Slovenian income level during the whole transition period has been 
the highest in Central and Eastern Europe. This is the background for the relatively high wage level 
measured in USD. It was 8-15 times higher than the Russian level. Although Slovenia as described 
below did not give many opportunities to foreigners in the privatization process FDI gradually in-
creased so the accumulated amount per capita over the period is on level with the most advanced 
transitional countries and dwarf the FDI going into Russia.  
 As the most developed part of former Yugoslavian self-management system Slovenia had a 
quite strong tradition for active employee participation in the governance of enterprises, which were 
socially owned in the sense that the employees had the formal right to control and they had the re-
sidual cash flow rights. However, they could not sell shares of the company and get a capital gain if 
the firm had increased its market value. Formally, the governance of the enterprises was in the 
hands of the employees since it was the workers’ councils that selected the management team. In 
practice however, governance of the enterprises was a bargaining process between four institutions: 
the self-management institutions of the employees, operative management, socio-political organiza-
tions and socio-political communities.  
With the decrease of political influence on business at the end of 1980es, the power of man-
agers in decision making increased. The managers were leading the privatization process, which in 
most cases was based on internal privatization - one of several ways of ownership transformation 
provided by the Law on Ownership Transformation, passed by the Slovenian Parliament in Novem-
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ber 1992. After the compulsory free transfer of shares to different State-controlled Funds (10 % to 
the Restitution Fund, 10 % to the Capital Fund (for reserve and pension purposes) and 20 % to the 
Development Fund (for further sale to the Privatization Investment Funds for cash or in exchange 
for vouchers) and after the distribution of 20 % of the shares to insiders in exchange for their 
vouchers, companies could freely decide on the allocation of the remaining 40 %. They could either 
privatize internally and sell them to insiders according to a special scheme or privatize externally 
and offer them to the public through a public offering of shares, public tender or public auction. The 
first scheme of internal privatization required the participation of at least one third of the employ-
ees. According to the scheme, the shares had first to be transferred to the Development Fund with 
the first 25 % acquired by the insiders immediately, while the remaining 75 % within the next four 
years (25 % per year over the whole period). The shares were sold under a 50 % discount and were 
transferable only among the participants of the internal buyout within a period of 2 years. Alterna-
tively, firms could choose to be liquidated and sell off their assets. In this case, the social capital 
and liabilities of the firm were transferred to the Slovenian Development Fund, the firm was can-
celled from the Company Register, while the funds gathered by the sale of assets were used for the 
repayment of liabilities and the implementation of an active employment policy. 
The Privatization Law was a compromise between three main approaches, all of which 
stressed privatization, but differed in the role of the state, managers, workers and foreign capital: i) 
the decentralized model that stressed worker-management buyouts of existing enterprises (proposed 
by Mencinger in 1989; ii) the centralized model, which was based on the re-nationalization and sub-
sequent privatization of all enterprises with domestic as well as foreign capital (advocated by sup-
porters of the ideas of Jeffrey Sachs) and iii) the semi-decentralized model based on mixed owner-
ship taking into account the heterogeneity of the enterprises (advocated by Ribnikar and Prasnikar 
in 1991, see Prasnikar, Gregoric and Pahor, 2004). The adopted privatization method involved a 
combination of cash and voucher privatization; with regard to the latter, about 2 million vouchers of 
a total value of DM 9.4 billion (representing about 40 % of the total estimated book value of social 
capital) were distributed to citizens of the Republic of Slovenia. The vouchers were non-
transferable and could be used only for acquiring shares in the internal distribution, the internal 
buyout, public offering of shares, and in exchange for shares of the Privatization Investment Funds 
(PIFs). 
The model favored employee ownership, but at the same time it addressed the problem of 
risk concentration in employee owned enterprises. In this sense the 10 % to the pension fund was 
the base for the fully risk-diversified pension-scheme. The Privatization Investment Funds (PIFs), 
where Slovenian could place part of their vouchers, reflected personal investments also with a high 
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degree of diversification, while the shares received in the internal distribution and bought in the in-
ternal privatization implied a concentration of risk at the enterprise level, but these shares were at 
the same time the basis for the continuation of employees control of the company (Mygind 1991). 
The companies could chose one or a combination of the proposed privatization methods and 
submit their approvals to the Agency for Restructuring and Privatization in charge of the ownership 
transformation in Slovenia. The Privatization Agency gave its first approval on 29 July 1993 and its 
last approval at the end of October 1998. During these six years, more than 1300 companies (96.2 
%) successfully completed the ownership transformation and were entered into the Court Register. 
The 55 companies that did not end the privatization program were either transferred to the Devel-
opment Fund or liquidated. Among privatized firms, more than 90 % chose the internal distribution 
and internal buyout as the main privatization method. Internal owners ended up holding about 40 % 
of the social capital subject to privatization. The social capital to be privatized represented only 68 
% of the existing social capital, while most of the remaining 32 % remained under the ownership of 
the State (Privatization Agency, 1999). PIFs got about 25 %, state funds got 22 %, while the re-
maining 13 % were publicly sold in exchange for vouchers. Internal ownership prevailed as domi-
nant mostly in smaller, labor-intensive firms; workers and management obtained more than 60 % 
stake in 319 firms (24.4 % of all firms), but only 8.1 % of total capital. On the other hand, their 
share did not exceed 10 % in 82 companies (6.3%) accounting for nearly 30 % of total capital (Pri-
vatization Agency report 1999). 
The model based on state funds, Privatization Investment Funds and employee shares with 
restricted transferability for a certain period implied some limitations on trade of shares and adjust-
ment of ownership structure. Simoneti et.al. 2001 point to the problems connected to this delay in 
the transferability of large volumes of shares. They also criticize the distribution of ownership on 
different agents with conflicting interests, often implying a battle between the outside funds on one 
side and the insiders on the other.  
In general the Slovenian legislation related to corporate governance is on level with the 
standard in most EU-countries, and the implementation is also about to reach this level. Some spe-
cial features are however worth emphasizing:  
An empirical analysis conducted in 2001 of 35 shareholders’ general meetings, shows that 
70 % of the votes were cast. This relatively high percentage is mainly explained by a quite high 
concentration of ownership. The system of small shareholders representation and proxy voting are 
not so developed in Slovenia, except for cases where managers have organized proxy voting of em-
ployee shares. Slovenia has like in Russia a system of 25 % blocking shares for important decisions 
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at the general meeting. Other rules give 5-10 % of the shareholders right to challenge decisions 
threatening the value of their shares e.g. by calling extraordinary general meetings (Gregoric 2003). 
Concerning equal rights of shareholders the Companies Act imposes the one-share-one-vote 
rule, however this equality can be broken by issuing preference shares with priority on dividends, 
but without voting rights (Gregoric 2003). Caps on voting rights have been used to limit the control 
of large shareholders and have functioned as anti-takeover devices in some large Slovenian compa-
nies. However, voting caps have been prohibited for listed firms with the amendment of the Com-
panies Act in 2001. There were a series of battles for ownership in large Slovenian companies in the 
latest years, and there are recent attempts demanding higher transparency in relation to takeovers.  
The Privatization Investment Funds, which were originally capitalized through vouchers, 
took over quite large parts of the enterprises. They were managed by management companies, 
which through proxies and later through direct ownership de facto controlled the PIFs. This hap-
pened often parallel to a process where the PIFs were transformed to Public Limited Companies 
(PLCs), without the PIFs’ 5 %-limit for the single largest shareholders (Gregoric 2003).  
The Slovenian Co-determination Law from 1993 (amended 2001) gives the employees some 
rights to control in questions concerning human resource management. They have the right to form 
workers’ councils and to be represented in the supervisory board by 1/3 of the seats. On top of this 
there 68% of the workers are members of the main union. 
In 1994 Slovenia introduced new bankruptcy legislation. The implementation was reason-
able, but according to the EU-Commission (2002) procedures were rather slow. However, in 2000 
and 2001 the number of bankruptcy cases rose sharply because of the introduction of more appro-
priate legislation, higher efficiency in the judicial system and the state becoming more actively in-
volved in tax recovery procedures and as petitioner in bankruptcy procedures. 
There was already from the self-management period a tradition for commercial banks. They 
were, however, strongly dominated by the largest companies, and loans were based more on ration-
ing and soft budget constraints than on sound principles like in developed market economies. How-
ever, the transition to a fully market oriented system started with the establishment of a bank-
restructuring agency in 1991. In the process of rehabilitation the banks came under state govern-
ance, bad loans were cleaned and privatization process initiated. The rehabilitation process was 
concluded by 1997. Bad loans dropped from a level of 22 % in 1994 to 10 % of loans in 2002 
(EBRD 2003). The privatization of banks was relatively slow with one of the largest banks privat-
ized as late as 2002 to a Belgium banking group. After this most of the banking sector was privat-
ized and 16 % of the total assets in Slovenian banks were in banks with majority foreign ownership. 
The banking function of lending to the private sector was already in 1991 on a level of 35 % of 
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GDP. Then it fell somewhat during the period of cleaning bad debt and since 1993 is has been in-
creasing steadily to reach a level of 41 % of GDP in 2002. Although this is lower than the EU aver-
age, Slovenia is on a quite high level measured by East European standards (Cufer et. al 2002). 
The stock exchange in Ljubljana opened already in 1990, but capitalization and trading did 
not take off before the first privatized firms were listed in 1996. Then the capitalization of shares 
grew quite fast to reach 23% of GDP in 2002, and total capitalization as share of GDP was in 2001 
the highest in Eastern Europe (Caviglia et al 2002). However, like in other transitional countries the 
trade is still rather thin and concentrated around relatively few shares. 
 
Before we go to the empirical analysis we will sum up the hypotheses for how the cultural, 
economic and first of all the institutional development can be expected to influence the governance 
cycle in the two countries. What specificities of the cycle can be expected? What can we say about 
the speed of adjustment at different stages? How advanced do we expect the cycle to be?  
In both countries the privatization model gives a starting point with a high degree of em-
ployee ownership. The question is if the next step for these enterprises will be management owner-
ship as predicted in the theoretical section and how fast this process will happen?  
In Russia the managers are in a strong position because of: the paternalistic leadership style 
and low experience and tough liquidity constraints for the employees. The low development of gov-
ernance institutions with low transparency gives high possibilities for transactions moving the as-
sets into the hands of the manager. Although the financial system is not advanced and it is difficult 
for managers to get loans for buy-outs the price may be so low, that this is not an important barrier. 
Therefore, we expect the change to manager-ownership to be quite fast and widespread in Russia. 
In Slovenia the financial system developed quite fast, but at the same time the governance 
institutions were also highly developed making it difficult for the managers to make covert deals. 
The fact, that the employees are used to participate in ownership is probably the most important 
barrier for manager takeovers from employees in Slovenia. We assume that employees are not easy 
to manipulate, and they have an understanding for the value of their shares. Because of the high 
competitiveness of most Slovenian firms the actual market value of the shares may be relatively 
high. Even if managers could get some loans in the banks it would often not be enough to finance a 
manager takeover. The prices for the employee shares could not be substantially reduced because 
the Slovenian wage-level is rather high and the employees are not desperate to sell their shares at 
rock bottom prices. Furthermore, the Slovenian privatization model included regulations that made 
employees shares less transferable for a certain period. Thus, instead of a takeover it may be a more 
realistic strategy for managers to make an alliance with the employees e.g. in the form of Workers’ 
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Associations (AWAs). Such a strategy would make manager takeovers less frequent and employee-
ownership more stable in Slovenia than predicted in the theoretical section. 
The next step in the governance cycle to external, but concentrated owners, demands a more 
sophisticated development of the governance institutions to avoid the manager-owner governance 
problem. Such development is expected to be slow in Russia. The exception will be large compa-
nies where the manager needs an alliance with strong external groups to get a dominating position. 
The different state funds and the developing Privatization Investment Funds in the Slove-
nian privatization model, give external owners a quite strong position already from the time of pri-
vatization. Slovenia’s faster institutional development, the advanced financial sector and early 
tough bankruptcy legislation are expected to encourage a relatively fast adjustment to external own-
ership.  
Finally, a fast transition process and development of the institutional system improve the 
business climate and attract foreign investors, and therefore facilitate a faster change in the direc-
tion of foreign ownership. We do not expect to see this development for the Russian enterprises in 
the period under observation. Slovenia offers foreign investors better conditions, but a move to 
more foreign ownership may to some degree be blocked by the different Slovenian funds. 
We expect a strong tendency in the direction of stronger concentration in Russia to limit the 
owner-manager problem in a relatively weak institutional setting. These tendencies may not be so 
strong in Slovenia. The question is, if the Slovenian institutional setting has reached such a level 
that the majority-minority governance problem has been so much reduced that it opens up for an 
increased weight on diversified share-ownership. The developed system of both state governed pen-
sion funds and Privatization Investment Funds may work as alternative channels for small diversi-
fied investors. Thus, the tendency for higher concentration may prevail in the observed period. 
 
IV. Data and empirical analysis 
Much literature has examined ownership structures after privatization in transition econo-
mies with considerable attention paid to investigating the relation between ownership and perform-
ance (e.g. Estrin and Wright 1999; Djankov and Murrell, 2002.) Studies that investigate post-
privatization ownership dynamics are more rare. Earle and Estrin (1996), Blasi et al (1997), Estrin 
and Wright (1999) and Filatochev et al (1999) analyze Russia and document the strong position of 
insiders in privatization and the tendency for management takeovers of employee owned enter-
prises. The same tendency is found for the Baltic countries by Jones and Mygind, 1999 and 2004. 
Jones et al (2003) using data for Estonia, also document the strong tendency away from employee 
ownership most often to manager owners.  
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Simoneti et al (2001) have analyzed ownership dynamics of 183 Slovenian mass-privatized 
companies from the time or privatization to 1999. They found increased concentration especially in 
insider owned companies. State funds and small shareholders including employees had reduced 
their shares while managers and strategic investors had increased their ownership. They also found 
that quite few foreign investors had taken over dominant shares in Slovenian companies.  
In this section we wish to see if there is empirical support for our notion of the governance 
life cycle. We will analyze the determinants behind ownership changes and see if there are marked 
differences between the two countries. Ownership groups are determined according to the widely 
used “dominant owner” approach, where the firm is assigned to the owner group holding more 
shares than any other group. By using the dominant rather than the majority ownership approach we 
are able to include firms, which would otherwise be dropped to the “no overall majority” group. 
We have got ownership data for a panel of firms in each country through special ownership 
surveys. However, because of varying opportunities for data collection, the panel sets data varies 
between the two countries. The Russian panel has been collected by a team connected to The Rus-
sian Economic Barometer (REB), which is a Moscow-based independent research center founded in 
1991. They do regular business surveys and the REB respondent network of industrial enterprises 
includes about 700 entities from different industries and regions of Russia. In terms of size, indus-
tries and methods of privatization the REB sample is representative for the population of Russian 
medium- and large-size industrial enterprises. The usual response rate is close to 30 %. In two years 
intervals starting from 1995 blocks of questions on ownership and corporate governance have been 
included in the standard REB questionnaire. Since 1999 it also covered the identity and ownership 
of the largest shareholder.  
In Slovenia the target group consisted of a representative sample of 623 Slovenian non-
financial joint-stock companies (all companies) with shares registered in the Shareholders’ Register 
of the Central Clearing Securities Corporation. The questionnaires were collected during the sum-
mer of 2003. 150 companies returned filled questionnaires giving a response rate of 24 %. They 
employed on average 500 employees and generated 10 billions SIT (around 50 million Euro) of 
yearly income. The questions addressed the whole period between 1998-2003 on a yearly basis con-
cerning: Corporate governance: ownership structure (total ownership by separate group of owners), 
evaluation of the influence of separate groups of owners, composition of the supervisory board. 
Data on identity and ownership stakes of the largest shareholders were obtained from the Official 
Shareholders’ Register, which is kept and updated by the Central Clearing Securities Corporation. 
We will first present the ownership dynamics descriptively in transition matrices and then in 
multivariate analyses look closer at the determinants for ownership changes. The econometric 
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analysis includes more variables, but the ownership categories are more aggregated because of the 
relatively low number of observations. 
The evidence for ownership dynamics based on the Russian sample for the period 1995-
2003 is shown in tables 8 and 9. The response in the second-yearly surveys count around 150, but 
although the sample has remained the same there has been a rather high shift in the firms respond-
ing in every round. Table 8 shows the dynamics for each two years period including the companies 
who responded in two consecutive rounds. The transition matrix for 1995 to 1997 shows in the total 
column to the right, that out of the 41 reported firms 26 of them were employee dominated in 1995 
– the group of employees had a higher stake than the other mentioned owner-groups. 7 firms were 
dominated by non-financial domestic outsiders, 4 by financial outsiders etc. From the diagonal it 
can be seen that only 13 or 50% of the employee-dominated firms in 1995 were still dominated by 
employees in 1997. 2 firms have changed to manager ownership, 5 to non-financial outsiders, 3 to 
financial outsiders, 2 to foreign and 1 back to dominant state ownership. It is clear from the table 
that outsider domination is much more stable than domination by insiders. Only one out of the 11 
domestic outsider dominated firms has changed and this was to foreign dominant ownership. 
The changes from 1997 to 1999 are quite similar to the first matrix. Again the tendency 
away from ownership dominated by employees is very strong, and the most frequent change is to 
non-financial outsiders. Dominant employee ownership continues to be reduced by around 50% per 
period also in the two latest matrices. Now the changes to management ownership are on level with 
the change to non-financial outsiders. By far the biggest number behind the category non-financial 
outsiders covers domestic firms. Some of these firms may be dominated by managers from the tar-
get company. Therefore, the numbers for management domination are probably too low. 
The speed of change can also be summarized by the gross intensity of redistribution (Kape-
liushnykov 2001), which shows the average percentage of shares changing from one group to an-
other in each firm over a given period2. It was 31% for the two year period 1995-97, 30% for 1997-
1999, 34% for 1999-2001 and 35% for 2001-2003. This means that each year on average 15-18% of 
the shares change from one group to another group.  
For 123 companies observed in 1997-2003 we performed multivariate analyses (not re-
ported) of the relation between gross intensity of redistribution as dependent variable and employee, 
management, and outside dominant ownership together with financial results as explanatory vari-
ables. The analysis included a rough measure for profitability3, order book level as indicator for the 
adaptation to the new market conditions, number of employees and relative wage-level. Industry 
and regions were included as control variables. The results for the model with lagged explanatory 
variables show that companies dominated by managers or outsiders had a significantly lower inten-
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sity of redistribution than employee dominated firms. Financial outcome were the only significant 
economic variable in the model showing that tendency to loss-making speeded up the intensity of 
redistribution. Thus, together with the ownership structure, economic problems in the firms have 
been important determinants of redistribution of ownership in Russia. The dynamic analysis for the 
most frequent blocks in the ownership transition matrix with continuing employee dominance as the 
control group show significantly higher intensity of redistribution for all changing categories and no 
significant differences in intensity of redistribution for categories with continuing dominance. 
Changes in the financial variables have no significant effect on the intensity of redistribution. 
Table 9 summarizes all the changes for companies, which have been observed for at least 
two periods. More than half of all the companies are changing. Employee dominated firms are 
changing the most with the highest frequency going to non-financial outsiders, closely followed by 
a large group going to managers. The change for financial outsiders is also quite high, but spread on 
many different directions. The lowest frequency of change is for managers and non-financial out-
siders. The single foreign company represented is too thin evidence for conclusions on stability for 
this group, but it is a strong indication of the extremely low importance of foreign ownership in 
Russia.   
Table 10 includes those enterprises for the period 1999-2003 for which we have data on 
ownership for at least two points in time and for ownership by the single largest owners. Not sur-
prisingly, employee-dominated firms have the lowest concentration, and financial outsiders, foreign 
and state have the highest. The average stake of the single largest owner has increased from 31 % to 
38 % over the observed period. The biggest increase is found for enterprises taken over by manag-
ers from employees and from non-financial outsiders – these two changes are also the most frequent 
in this table. Some of the enterprises staying in the same category (frequencies reported on the di-
agonal) - management, and the two groups of domestic outsiders  – also have quite steeply increas-
ing concentration, and at the same time some of the categories of changes e.g. from state to non-
financial outsiders or from non financial outsiders to financial outsiders have falling concentration.  
For 70 Russian companies observed 2 or more times over the period 1999-2003 we per-
formed a multivariate analysis (not reported) showing that management and outsider dominated 
firms had a significantly higher concentration than firms dominated by employees. Also low finan-
cial outcomes and low wage turned out to be explanatory factors for high concentration. However, 
although we have used lagged explanatory variables, the causality and the mechanisms behind are 
not clear. One possibility could be that low performance lead to ownership change, which again 
lead to higher concentration. The dynamic analysis on the categories of change from the transition 
matrix with continuing employee ownership as the control group show significantly higher concen-
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tration for nearly all changing categories as well as for continuing dominance of managers and out-
siders. Low wage and performance turning from profit to losses indicate again high concentration. 
Table 11 shows the results from a logit-analysis on how different variables influence the 
probability for different types of ownership. The analysis is done both for the initial year and the 
last year of observation as well as for the determinants of ownership changes over the period. In the 
static analysis on top of table 11, bad financial outcome gives higher probability for outsider versus 
employee ownership both at the start and end year (although with weakening significance). How-
ever, higher order book level decreases the probability for employee ownership at least in the start 
year. Wage level and number of employees have only a quite weak influence.  
The number of employees comes out quite strongly in the analysis of ownership dynamics 
in the bottom part of table 11. The results are quite robust to whether the level and change variables 
are separated or combined and to the inclusion of control variables. The probability for a change 
from employees to outsiders compared to continuing employee ownership increases with higher 
number of employees. This is consistent with our predictions that higher size makes employee own-
ership less sustainable. Likewise in line with our predictions is the result that higher wage and also 
wage growth mean lower odds for the change from employee to outsiders compared to continuing 
employee ownership. However, for shifts from employee to manager we do not find such signifi-
cant results although the signs point in the same direction. 
 
When comparing the transition matrices in table 9 and 12 we observe some striking similari-
ties between the ownership dynamics in Russia and Slovenia: For both countries employee owner-
ship is the most frequent observation in the initial period, and it is decreasing very rapidly in both 
countries with many firms changing to other types of ownership and nearly no supply of new em-
ployee dominated firms. At the other end of the specter foreign dominant ownership is quite rare, 
but in Slovenia it is increasing rapidly and foreign ownership seems to be rather stable. Employee 
ownership has the highest degree of change and non-financial domestic outsiders have a quite low 
frequency of changes. Exactly 50 % of the observed 150 Slovenian firms changed dominant owners 
over the period, which for the average firm is a bit shorter than the observation period for Russia.  
However, there are also important differences between the observations for the two coun-
tries. With only 2 cases in the start and 4 in the end, management dominant ownership is surpris-
ingly rare in Slovenian medium and large enterprises. Employee domination rarely shifts to domi-
nant manager ownership. The governance cycle away from employee ownership goes in Slovenia 
directly to financial or non-financial outsiders. Like in Russia the group of non-financial outsiders 
mainly consists of domestic companies, and some of them may be owned by managers from the tar-
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get company. Financial outsider ownership is much more stable than in Russia. The PIFs have be-
come one of the most important dominant owners in Slovenia making up 35 of the dominant finan-
cial owned firms in the end of the period.  
The speed of change measured as the gross intensity of redistribution is somewhat lower in 
Slovenia. For the two years period the average change of ownership in each company is 22 % in the 
first years of observation and 17 % for the period 2001-2003. This means an average change per 
year of 9-11 % compared with 15-17 % for Russia. 
Surprisingly our multivariate analysis with the gross intensity of redistribution as the de-
pendent variable does not show a significant difference between outside and employee dominated 
companies. At the same time we had the steep fall in employee dominated firms, while the different 
outsider groups were rather stable (table 12). The explanation is probably that the same amount of 
changing shares could mean a fall in employee ownership and a change in domination, but for the 
outside owned a similar amount of shares changing hands would normally mean a consolidation – 
an increase in the dominant owners’ shares. This is reflected in increasing concentration for the out-
side owned companies, see below.  
For different specifications of the variables and method of analysis (OLS, random effects, 
fixed effects) growth in employment turned out with a significant negative effect on redistribution 
while the other explanatory variables for capital intensity, labor productivity, profitability and wage 
level as well as changes in these variables did not have any significant effects. For employee owned 
enterprises increase in employment could be taken as a signal for not selling the shares. However, 
more importantly, steeply falling employment gives a strong pressure for the employees, especially 
those leaving, to sell out as indicated in the theoretical section, table 1.  
Table 13 covers both the owner identity and the concentration on ownership on the first 
largest single owner. It covers only the period 1998-2001 because we do not have information on 
the identity and share of the first largest owner for 2002 and 2003. On average the level of concen-
tration on the single largest owner is quite similar to Russia. It has increased from 32 % to 39 %. 
The insider owned enterprises have the lowest concentration, while foreign and state owned has the 
highest concentration. Those enterprises staying insider owned have a stable concentration, while 
enterprises continuing with outsider ownership have growing concentration. The largest increases 
in concentration are recorded for the change from employees to foreign ownership, but also changes 
from employees to non-financial outsiders imply a strong increase in concentration. 
Table 14 shows the Slovenian ownership transition matrix based on the first largest single 
owner of the given enterprise. It is quite disaggregated to give a more precise picture. The PIFs play 
a strong role also in the initial period, because they usually belong to the largest investors in the 
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companies, where they are represented. It is however, noteworthy, that their frequency of domina-
tion is falling over the period, with domestic firms as the main beneficiary. The explanation is 
probably that they are increasing their prevalence in some firms, while they sell out in other firms. 
The domestic firms have also increased their position by taking over from the state funds (Capital 
Fund and Development Fund). No employees or managers are represented as the first largest single 
owner. However, some managers may be hidden behind the group domestic firms. Employees are 
often organized collectively in Workers’ Associations (AWAs). In this way the employees get ap-
parently a strong and stable stake of ownership. The concentration percentages for the AWAs are 
quite stable and somewhat higher than the average for the total observations. 
The state funds keep a quite stable ownership share in the enterprises where they continue as 
the strongest single owner. In the transitions from the capital fund we see a strong increase in con-
centration, especially when sold to domestic enterprises, while the sale to domestic firms on aver-
age means unchanged concentration. The remaining quite few and diversified cases of change of the 
largest owner show a quite varied pattern of concentration/diversification processes. Like in the ma-
trix for aggregated stakes some of the cases of no change in identity of ownership have quite strong 
growth in concentration. This is the case for firms owned by individuals, domestic firms and for-
eigners, while AWAs, PIFs, and the state funds have on average quite stable ownership stakes. 
The multivariate analysis on concentration confirms the descriptive results. Outside owner-
ship has a significantly higher concentration than the base category of employee dominated enter-
prises. No robust significant effects are found for the different economic explanatory variables in 
the different specifications4. However, for some specifications5 we find like in Russia a tendency so 
that low and falling wage level strengthen the tendency to concentration.  
Table 15 shows the results of the logit-analysis on the determinants of ownership structure 
for Slovenia here only divided in the two large groups of employees and outsiders. The very few 
manager and state dominated firms are excluded from the analysis. The analysis for the start year 
1998 show no significant results while the end year 2002 analysis confirms the theoretical predic-
tion that a high number of employees has a negative effect on the odds for employee in relation to 
outsider dominated ownership. This is also confirmed by the dynamic analysis in table 16 showing 
that higher number of employees increases the probability for a change from employees to outsiders 
compared to continuing employee ownership. Also in line with our predictions are the positive rela-
tion between high labor costs and odds for employee ownership for the 2002 analysis. However, 
this result is weakened by the positive relation between wage level and the odds for change away 
from employees in the dynamic analysis in the bottom part of table 15. It should be noted that this 
results is at the 10 % level and not robust for other specifications of the model. 
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The results on high capital-intensity increasing the probability of employee ownership is 
quite surprising and contradicting our theoretical predictions. It is only significant on the 10 % level 
in the static analysis, but in the dynamic analysis it is strongly significant on the 1 % level both in 
the first and the third column of the bottom part of table 15 and quite robust for variations in speci-
fications. It is difficult to explain why high capital intensity should increase the likelihood of em-
ployee ownership. There could be a selection bias so that employees have been able to choose the 
most valuable companies. However, in Slovenia employees had to pay more for capital-intensive 
firms in the privatization process. The earlier referred data from the privatization agency (1999) 
shows that employees own less in more capital intensive firms. However, our survey data does not 
cover the large group of small companies with high employee ownership. Although employees are 
somewhat weaker represented in the larger than in smaller companies, still they have dominant po-
sitions in some of them and apparently also those with high capital intensity6.  
A high level of labor productivity, measured as sales per employee, decreases the probabil-
ity of employee ownership. This is surprising in relation to the high capital-intensity, which should 
support higher labor productivity.  More studies must be made to go deeper behind these results. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
 We have analyzed changes in governance structures with focus on concentration and iden-
tity of owners over the life-cycle of the company. Based on agency, property rights, transaction cost 
and resource dependence theory and related to key stages of the life-cycle of the firm, we can iden-
tify a typical governance cycle for developed market economies, namely: manager?outside investor 
participation?outside investor takeover. This cycle develops in parallel with a tendency for a 
change from concentrated to more diversified ownership. The governance cycles are also deter-
mined by developments in the institutional and cultural framework and by specific market devel-
opments. 
The transitional economies are undergoing fundamental changes in institutions with emerg-
ing and changing markets creating specific conditions for enterprises and their life-cycles. Privati-
zation, pressures for restructuring and weak, but developing institutions define the conditions for 
the evolution of ownership structures. Thus, specific transitional governance cycles can be pre-
dicted.  
The method used for privatization from state to private ownership determines the initial 
ownership structure. In many transitional countries including Russia and Slovenia, privatization 
lead to widespread employee ownership. This type of stakeholder oriented ownership are not sus-
tainable if managers de facto control the firm and can manipulate the employees and set low prices 
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for manager takeovers of shares from liquidity-starved employees. Such takeovers solve the basic 
governance problem between owners and managers and management ownership can be expected to 
be prevalent in the framework of weak governance institutions. More advanced institutions give 
external owners better opportunities to control the managers, but at this stage a high concentration 
of ownership is needed to give external investors both the incentives and the strength to control the 
managers. The most advanced governance institutions also deal with the governance problem be-
tween majority and minority owners. Institutional protection of minority owners opens up for diver-
sified external ownership, but none of the transitional countries have yet reached this stage. There-
fore, the most widespread governance cycle in transitional countries with privatization favoring 
employee ownership can be predicted to be: employee?manager?outsider (with the last stage split 
in domestic?foreign in the most advanced transitions) and this governance cycle is accompanied 
with increasing concentration. 
Employees were favored in the privatization process in both Russia and Slovenia. This re-
sulted in an ownership structure dominated by insiders of which the majority of firms had employ-
ees as the dominant group with the most shares. The exception was in both countries some very 
large and capital-intensive companies. Foreign ownership was practically excluded from the priva-
tization in both countries and the role of foreign investors was negligible at the start of the post-
privatization process. The state still owned shares, but were seldom the dominant owner. 
The post-privatization dynamics show both important similarities and differences between 
the two countries. The Russian results supports to a high degree the proposed transition governance 
cycle of employee?manager?outsider ownership. Russia is still in a stage with very weak govern-
ance institutions and the managers are in a very strong position both in relation to employees and in 
relation to potential external owners. Most of the employee owned enterprises have changed to ei-
ther manager ownership or to the next step in the governance cycle, outside domestic ownership. 
Change from managers to outsiders is quite rare. However, some outsiders can be quite closely re-
lated to the managers and many of the changes from employees to outsiders are probably a cover 
for manager ownership. Therefore, outsider ownership may be somewhat exaggerated compared to 
manager ownership. The last step in the cycle involving foreign owners is extremely rare in Russia.  
In Slovenia we have also seen a strong development away from employee-dominated own-
ership. However, in contrast to Russia the Slovenian managers have only taken over dominant own-
ership position in quite few cases in the sample. The Slovenian cycle has to a high degree skipped 
this stage so the typical development is employee?outsider ownership. There can be several expla-
nations for this development: It can be argued that the institutional development in Slovenia is so 
advanced that outsiders are in a stronger position than what is typical for most transitional econo-
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mies. The owner-manager governance problem has not been solved by manager ownership, but by 
concentrated outside owners. However, if the cycle is so advanced in Slovenia, that the insider stage 
based on weak institutions has been passed, it is surprising still to find a relatively high number of 
employee dominated firms. The cultural/historical heritage, the relatively high Slovenian income 
level, and specific institutional settings like the format of AWA – Workers Associations – may be 
the explanation.  The AWAs represent an alliance between managers and workers. The managers 
have probably a strong position in this alliance, but they are not able to manipulate the workers nor 
take over the workers’ shares for a low price like it has been common in Russia. 
A high proportion of Slovenian companies have ended up as dominated by domestic finan-
cial outsiders in the form of Privatization Investment Funds. Is this an indicator of high sophistica-
tion of the institutional system in Slovenia? The PIFs were integrated in the Slovenian privatization 
model, and although the regulation has been stronger than in Russia the governance system in rela-
tion to the PIFs is much debated and new legislation has been enacted in 2003 (EBRD 2003). An 
indication that Slovenian governance is not so advanced, is the fact that companies are still in a 
stage of increasing concentration. The stock exchange and the protection of minority investors have 
apparently not been strong enough for the development of more diversified shareholder ownership. 
The PIFs to some extent represent diversified domestic investors, but in the latest years a concentra-
tion of ownership has also taken place within these funds.  
The governance institutions are more advanced in Slovenia than in Russia. Both countries 
have followed parts of the proposed governance cycle for transitional economies changing the own-
ership from employee ownership in the direction of concentrated domestic outsider ownership. In 
Russia this transformation has happened through a stage of manager ownership, a stage that seems 
to play a minor role in Slovenia. However, the strong role of ownership by other domestic firms 
may in both countries cover manager ownership and should be investigated further.   
The analysis shows that both countries have had a quite rapid change in ownership struc-
tures with more than half of the companies changing dominant owners over the relatively short pe-
riod of analysis. The gross intensity of redistribution is somewhat lower in Slovenia than in Russia, 
indicating that the first stage of rapid changes have been passed in Slovenia. In Russia the redistri-
bution is especially high for employee dominated companies, while we see no significant differ-
ences between owner types in Slovenia. In both countries there are indications that economic prob-
lems, falling employment, induce ownership change, and this change is mostly accompanied with 
increasing concentration. This is probably one reason why low and falling wage levels can be con-
nected to high concentration both in Russia and Slovenia. 
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The specific determinants behind the ownership changes were quite difficult to detect in the 
quantitative analyses. Both for Russia and Slovenia high number of employees means lower odds 
for employee ownership and high wage gives lower odds for change away from employee owner-
ship. The results for other performance variables are not clear. Contrary to our theoretical predic-
tions we found that high capital intensity increased the odds for employee ownership in Slovenia. In 
Russia data for capital was not collected because of lack of reliability for this type of data. Although 
the institutional development is more advanced in Slovenia and the accounting information more 
reliable, the Slovenian results on capital intensity may be questioned and needs further research. 
The concept of governance cycle and the application to transitional conditions contribute to 
explain the ownership dynamics both in relation to the enterprise life-cycle and in an institutional 
perspective. However, the importance of different drivers behind the specific changes over the gov-
ernance cycle opens up for further research both quantitative analyses and case studies to reveal de-
tailed stories about the background and the actual implementation of the changes at the firm level. 
 30
Table 1.  Summary of predictions for determinants of ownership change – firm level. 
From employee ownership To manager ownership 
Capital constraint => not too 
large and capital intensive. 
Information advantage => 
managers opportunity to take 
over best performing firms. 
-  Size 
-  Capital intensity 
?  Wage 
+  Performance 
To outsider ownership 
+ Size  
High number of employees => free rider problem,  
                                                  high costs of decision making. 
Falling number of employees => some owners become outsiders, 
                                                     often sell off in the process. 
+ Capital intensity 
High capital intensity => high capital needs per employee, capi-
tal constraint, weak financial system => low employee owner-
ship. Increasing capital intensity => need shift of owners 
 
- Wage 
Low wage => liquidity constraint for employees, more sell off 
Indicator of low quality, low human capital =>  
not fit for employee ownership 
Falling wage, increased constraint => sell off 
 
? Performance: indicators: profit-margin, ROA, ROE 
High profitability => high incentive to sell and get capital 
But very low profitability, crisis, also push for new owners 
Falling profitability => pressure for sell out 
Capital advantage => size and 
capital intensity no constraint. 
Employee owners leaving the 
firm can increase the formal 
number of outside owners. 
Information disadvantage. 
+  Size 
+  Capital intensity 
?  Wage 
-  Performance 
 
Table 2.  Governance cycle in developed market economies 
start up stage    
entrepreneur-ownership (management, family ownership)   
 
early growth stage  
change in ownership/governance because of need of supply of  
external capital, management skills and networks by: 
- bank (often rather passive role in relation to management) 
- closely related investors, take active part in management 
- venture capital, take active part in management 
 
later growth stage 
change in ownership/governance because of need of supply of  
external capital, management skills and networks by: 
- strategic investor, take full control with the company 
- public investors, often diversified ownership 
 
crisis/restructuring stage   
change in ownership/governance because of takeover by 
- bank (bad loans de facto transferred to ownership capital) 
- venture capital (often specialized in takeovers (often unfriendly)) 
- strategic investor (use opportunity to take over cheap assets) 
- defensive takeover by insiders (to avoid close down and unemployment) 
- close down (assets transferred to other use) 
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Table 3.  Specific elements in early transition influencing the governance cycle 
 
Starting stage determined by privatization method, which may favor managers,  
other employees, concentrated foreign investors or diversified external ownership.   
 
Most enterprises have a strong need of restructuring 
(inputs, production methods, outputs not adjusted to new market conditions,  
 with a new set of prices and incentives.) 
 
The financial system not developed,  
- external finance from banks limited 
- the stock exchange not functioning 
- venture capital firms not existing 
 
The governance institutions for securing property rights  
(especially shareholder rights) not fully developed 
=>   
widespread insider ownership 
enterprises have to rely on internal finance 
slow strategic restructuring 
 
 
Table 4.  Expected governance cycles in countries in transition 
 
Privatized (starting point depends on privatization method) 
    employee ? manager ? outside concentrated  (domestic ? foreign) 
    diversified domestic ? manager ? outside concentrated  (domestic ? foreign) 
    outside concentrated, foreign stable (very long run more diversified for large listed companies) 
New 
     manager ? outside concentrated  (domestic ?  foreign) 
     foreign  concentrated (stable) 
 
 
Table 5. Some economic indicators for the transition process in Russia and Slovenia 
 
 production 1989=100 unemployment av. wage/month USD FDI/capita
 1995 1999 2002 1995 1999 2002 1995 1999 2002 1989-2002 
Russia 62   61   74 9.2% 12.6% 8.6% 117   64 123    48 USD 
Slovenia 93 110 122 7.4%   7.4% 5.9% 945 953 911 1702 USD 
based on EBRD 2003 
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Table 6.  Overview over privatization of enterprises in Russia and Slovenia 
 
 Russia Slovenia 
Starting point pre-
privatizaiton 
large centralized enterprises 
paternalistic management, only 
formal control by labor collective 
medium to large enterprises 
self-management,social owner-
ship 
influence by labour-collective 
early privatization 
/ early private ori-
ented enterprises 
during 1980es 
1986 law on new cooperatives, 
employee own, manager control 
1987 law: individual micro firms  
1989 law: labor collective lease + 
right to buy, management control 
1992: 9500 firms, 9% of workers 
managers get quite  strong posi-
tion in the end of the 1980es with 
further liberalization 
wild privatization tunneling to new private entities  
=> management or outside do-
mestic core-investor ownership 
probably not so widespread 
small privatization strong regional differences 
auctions or lease buy outs,  
By June 1994:  80% privatized,  
of which 60% employee-owned 
integrated in large privatization 
mass privatization fall 1992-94, 
15000 large and medium sized 
firms with  > 70% of production, 
150 mill vouchers to population 
option 1: (21% of firms) 
25% non-voting free to employees
10% option to buy at 30% dis-
count on low book value Jan 1992 
option 2: (over 70% of firms) 
51% for cash and vouchers to em-
ployees at 1.7 * book value 1992 
=> 70% of firms employee owned 
option 3: (quite few firms) 
30% to buy for investor group 
20% buy for insiders 30%discount
1995 
loans-for-shares, mortgage priva-
tization of 12 large jewel firms 
to Financial Industrial Groups 
closely related to the president 
large privatization 
 
 
1996- case-by-case privatizations, 
direct sale often through tenders, 
increasing speed and transparency 
December 1992 vouchers distrib-
uted (non transferable) 
privatization model: 
10% to State Restitution Fund 
10% to State Capital Fund 
20% to Development Fund, later 
sale to Privatization Invest. Funds 
remaining 60%: 
internal priv: 90% of firms 
20% for vouchers to employees  
up to 40% internal buyout by min 
1/3 employees, 50% discount 
rest: public sale (Slovenians pre-
emptive rights before foreigners) 
or: to Development Fund 
liquidation 4% of firms, em-
ployee involved in the process 
 
ownership after privatization: 
40% internal, mostly to  
         labor-intensive SMEs 
25% Privatization Investmt Funds 
22% Restitution/Capital Funds 
13% publicly sold (for vouchers) 
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Table 7.  The development of governance institution in Russia and Slovenia 
 Russia Slovenia 
Bankruptcy legislation Strict law 1998    
adjusted 2002 , enforced? 
first law 1994 
stronger enforcement 2000- 
Governance 
enterprise 
competition 
corporate governance 
developments 
1995          2002         2003 
    2                2+             2+ 
    2                2+             2+ 
1990es much tunneling + abu-
ses of minority investor rights, 
1994 MMM pyramid invest-
ment fund scandal  
1996 JSC law, securities law, 
but still weak implementation 
2002 Code of Conduct  
1995         2002           2003 
    3-              3                 3 
    2               3-                3- 
Companies Act 1993, quite se-
cure shareholders’ rights, 
Takeover act 1997, problems 
Worker codetermination 1993 
Investment Fund law 1994 
revised 2003, PIF problems 
Bank market 
total number  (foreign) 
state owned banks  % assets 
private loans as % GDP 
bad loans as % of total loans 
regulation  
EBRD score 
1995          2002         2003 
2297 (21)  1329 (37) 
37 (1997) 
  8.7            17.3 
12.3            11.4 
Quite loose 
    2                2               2 
1995          2002         2003 
39 (6)        22 (6) 
41.7           48.6          priv 
27.3           41.0 
  9.3           10.0 (2001) 
quite good  
    3                3+             3+ 
Stock market                start  
 
listed firms 
share capitalization % GDP 
turnover/capitalization % 
EBRD score 
1991 Moscow 
1995          2002         2003 
                   247 
4.8             36.5 
                     5 
   2                2+              3- 
1990 Ljubljana 
1995      2000      2002      2003 
 ca.40     154       139          136 
   2          17           23            23 
               21           23            23 
   3-          3-            3-            3- 
based on EBRD 2003, Gregoric 2003, ECB 2002, RTS (www.rts.ru), Ljubljana Stock Exchange (www.ljse.si), 
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Table 8.   Ownership transition matrices for Russia 1995-2003 
1995  \  1997 Dominant Shareholders 1997 
Dominant Share-
holders 1995 
Manag-
ers 
Em-
ployees 
Non-fin. 
outsiders 
Financial 
outsiders
Foreign State Total 
1995 
Managers 1 0 1*) 0 0 0 2 
Employees 2 13 5 3 2 1 26 
Non-fin. outsiders 0 0 6 1 0 0 7 
Financial outsiders 0 0 2 1 1 0 4 
Foreign 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
State 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 
Total 1997 3 13 15 5 3 2 41 
*)   for this firm share of managers and workers were equal in 1995 
 
1997  \  1999 Dominant Shareholders 1999 
Dominant Share-
holders 1997 
Manag-
ers 
Em-
ployees 
Non-fin. 
outsiders
Financial 
outsiders
Foreign State Total 
1997 
Managers   5*) 2 0 0 0 0 7 
Employees 1 13 8 0 0 0 22 
Non-fin. outsiders     1**) 3 4 0 0 0 8 
Financial outsiders 0 2 0 2 0 0 4 
Foreign 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
State 0 0 1 0 0 4 5 
Total 1999 7 20 13 2 1 4 47 
*)   for 2 firms share of managers and workers were equal in 1997 
**) for this firm share of non-financial outsiders and workers were equal in 1997 
 
1999 \  2001 Dominant Shareholders 2001 
Dominant Share-
holders 1999 
Manag-
ers 
Em-
ployees 
Non-fin. 
outsiders
Financial 
outsiders
Foreign State Total 
1999 
Managers 9 0 1 0 0 0 10 
 Employees 9 9 7*) 1 0 0 26 
Non-fin. outsiders 2 4 21 3 0 0 30 
Financial outsiders 1 0 0 4 0 1 6 
Foreign 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
State 0 0 2 0 0 4 6 
Total 2001 21 13 31 8 0 5 78 
*)   for 1 firm share of non-financial outsiders and workers were equal in 1999 
 
2001  \  2003 Dominant Shareholders 2003 
Dominant Share-
holders 2001 
Manag-
ers 
Em-
ployees 
Non-fin. 
outsiders
Financial 
outsiders
Foreign State Total 
2001 
Managers 7*) 3 2 1 0 0 13 
Employees 4 9 4 0 0 0 17 
Non-fin. outsiders 6 1 16 2 1 0 26 
Financial outsiders 0 1 2 1 0 0 4 
Foreign 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
State 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Total 2003 17 14 25 4 1 0 61 
*)   for 1 firm share of managers and workers were equal in 2001 
 
Table 9.  Ownership transition matrix Russia 1995-2003 (first by last years recorded) 
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1995  \  2003 Dominant Shareholders (end ) 
Dominant Share-
holders (start) 
Mana-
gers 
Em-
ployees
Non-fin. 
outsider
Finance 
outsider
For-
eign 
State Total 
start 
change
 
Managers   10*) 2 3 0 0 0 15 33% 
Employees 17 22 21    6**) 1 1 68 68% 
Non-fin.  outsiders 9 4 25 5 1 1 45 44% 
Financial outsiders 2 1 2 4 1 2 12 67% 
Foreign 0 0 0 0 1 0   1   0% 
State 0 1 5 0 0 5 11 55% 
Total (end) 38 30 56 15 4 9 152 56% 
*)   for 2 firms share of managers and workers were equal in the beginning 
**)   for 1 firm share of workers, financial outsiders and state were equal at the end 
 
 
Table 10  Russia 1999-2003 with average concentration on first largest owner 
 
1999  \  2003 Dominant Shareholders (end ) 
Dominant Share-
holders (start) 
Manag-
ers 
Em-
ployees 
Non-fin. 
outsiders
Financial 
outsiders
Foreign State Total 
(start) 
Managers 10*)
(30/37) 
0 2 
(20/37) 
0 0 0 12 
(29/37) 
Employees 5 
(14/28) 
10 
(15/14) 
3 
(11/21) 
0 
 
0 0 18 
(14/19) 
Non-financial    
outsiders 
7 
(30/57) 
2 
(11/21) 
19 
(31/40) 
3 
(54/54) 
1 
(20/51) 
0 32 
(32/44) 
Financial outsiders 0 0 2 
(61/68) 
3 
(41/50) 
0 0 5 
(49/57) 
Foreigner 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
State 0 0 2 
(64/21) 
0 
 
0 3 
(87/68) 
5 
(76/49) 
Total (end) 22 
(26/41) 
12 
(15/15) 
28 
(32/38) 
6 
(48/52) 
1 
(20/51) 
3 
(87/68) 
72 
(31/38) 
Average  size (%) of the first largest block (beginning /end ) in parenthesis. 
*)   for 1 firm share of managers and workers were equal in the beginning 
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Table 11.  Determinant of ownership, 1997-2003, Russia 
multinomial logit.  
 Managers versus Em-
ployeesa)
Outsiders versus   Em-
ployeesa)
Managers versus  
Outsidersb)
(123 observations) Start End Start End Start End 
financial outcome, t-1 
profit=1, balance=2, loss=3 
-0.59 
(0.42) 
0. 09 
(0.37) 
-0.81**
(0.32) 
-0.48* 
(0.28) 
0.22 
(0.44) 
0.54*
(0.30) 
Order book level, t-1  
Normal = index 100 
2.80** 
(0.95) 
1.11
(0.98) 
1.30**
(0.61) 
0.23 
(0.88) 
1.50* 
(.85) 
0.88
(0.76) 
Ln no. of employees t-1 -0.67* 
(0.41) 
-0.33
(0.29) 
-0.13 
(0.22) 
0.12 
(0.27) 
-0.54
(0.40) 
-0.45** 
(0.22) 
Wage (deviation from 
years’ mean) t-1 
0.72
(0.99) 
-0.41 
(0.65) 
0.84 
(0.66) 
-1.18*
(0.62) 
-0.12
(0.88) 
0.77 
(0.65) 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 2.72 
(2.76) 
2.05 
(2.05) 
2.86*
(1.53) 
1.66 
(1.93) 
-0.14 
(2.73) 
0.39 
(1.46) 
 
1997-2003  
combined year to year 
changes,  
(165 observations) 
Change from 
employee to 
managers vs 
continuing 
employeec)
Change from 
employee to 
outsiders vs 
continuing 
employeec)
Continuing 
managers vs 
continuing 
employee own-
ershipc)
Continuing 
outsiders vs 
continuing 
employee 
ownershipc)
Change from 
outsiders to 
insiders vs 
continuing 
outsiderd)
financial outcome,  t-1 -1.03*
(0.60) 
-0.47 
(0.56) 
0.10 
(0.63) 
-0.88** 
(0.41) 
-0.55 
(0.40) 
financial outcome 
change: loss to profit 
-0.03 
(1.08) 
1.22 
(0.95) 
1.59 
(1.34) 
-0.17 
(0.90) 
1.00 
(0.85) 
financial outcome 
change: profit to loss  
0.79 
(1.26) 
1.38 
(1.08) 
-1.46 
(1.12) 
1.05
(0.80) 
-0.94 
(0.85) 
Order book level, t-1 0.08
(1.72) 
-0.63
(1.32) 
2.15*
(1.10) 
-0.49 
(0.97) 
2.13* 
(1.15) 
Order book level, 
changes 
-1.31
(1.81) 
-1.19
(1.63) 
0.79 
(2.02) 
-0.15 
(1.26) 
-0.53
(1.19) 
Ln number of em-
ployees, t-1 
0.04
(0.31) 
0.90***
(0.36) 
-0.07 
(0.36) 
0.47*
(0.26) 
-0.19
(0.29) 
Number of employ-
ees, index 
3.57
(2.60) 
2.07
(1.81) 
1.88 
(1.82) 
2.10 
(1.65) 
1.57
(1.87) 
Wage, t-1 (deviation 
from years’ mean) 
-0.01
(0.98) 
-3.80**
(1.94) 
-0.10 
(0.87) 
-0.97 
(0.72) 
0.21
(0.70) 
Wage, index -0.67
(0.50) 
-0.96*** 
(0.47) 
-1.10*** 
(0.44) 
-0.39 
(0.36) 
0.24
(0.31) 
Industry (dummy) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regions (dummy) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Years  (dummy) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 5.14*
(3.08) 
-2.47 
(3.15) 
-0.66 
(3.53) 
2.99 
(2.53) 
0.14 
(2.03) 
a) employee dominated firms as base category,   b) outsider dominated firms used as base category 
c) continuing dominant employee as base category, d) continuing dominant outsider base category 
*** significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. 
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Table 12. Ownership transition matrix for Slovenia 1998-2003 (first\last years recorded) 
 
1998  \  2003 Dominant Shareholders (end ) 
Dominant Share-
holders (start) 
Mana-
gers 
Em-
ployees
Non-fin. 
outsider
Finance 
outsider
For-
eign 
State Total 
start 
change
 
Managers 1 0 1 0 0 0   2 50% 
Employees 3 23 24 14 3 7 74 69% 
Non-fin.  outsiders 0 0 17 0 1 1 19 11% 
Financial outsiders 0 1 5 17 0 0 23 26% 
Foreign 0 1 0 0 3 0   4 25% 
State 0 1 4 5 2 12 24 50% 
Total (end) 4 26 51 36 9 20 146 50% 
Employees include (few) former employees, Non-financial outsiders = domestic firms and individuals, Financial out-
siders = Privatization Investment Funds (PIFs) + one bank, State = state funds+other (state). 
 
 
Table 13  Slovenia 1998-2001 with average concentration on first largest owner 
 
1998  \  2001 Dominant Shareholders (end ) 
Dominant Share-
holders (start) 
Manag-
ers 
Em-
ployees 
Non-fin. 
outsiders
Financial 
outsiders
Foreign State Total 
(start) 
Managers 2 
17/17 
1 
12/20 
0 0 0 0 3 
15/18 
Employees 1 
12/10 
25 
23/22 
17 
27/49 
15 
27/38 
3 
23/66 
8 
24/36 
69 
25/35 
Non-financial  out-
siders 
0 0 16 
40/49 
0 0 1 
18/20 
17 
39/47 
Financial outsiders 1 
50/40 
1 
12/13 
3 
21/38 
16 
34/42 
0 0 21 
32/40 
Foreigner 0 1 
28/21 
0 0 3 
52/67 
0 4 
46/55 
State 0 1 
74/19 
5 
38/47 
2 
22/40 
2 
37/31 
12 
60/51 
22 
50/46 
Total (end) 4 
24/21 
29 
24/22 
41 
33/48 
33 
30/40 
8 
37/58 
21 
45/44 
136 
32/39 
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Table 14. Slovenia first largest owner matrix, & average concentration 1998/2001 % 
 
1998  /  2001 AWA Indi- 
vidual 
Dom. 
firms 
PIF Bank For-
eign
Capi-
tal F
Restit. 
Fund
Dev. 
Fund 
State Total change 
% 
AWA  6 
45/43 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
45/43
0
Individuals 0 6 
19/30 
0 0 1
36/43
0 0 0 0 0 7
21/28
14
Domestic 
firms 
0 0 22 
37/54 
0 1
12/13
1
20/59
1
25/17
0 0 0 25
35/51
12
Privatization 
Invest. Funds 
0 2 
21/23 
9 
37/54 
34
30/35
2
21/41
2
20/50
0 1
20/10
0 2 
12/40 
52
28/36
35
Banks 0 0 1 
34/52 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
34/52
100
Foreigners 1 
28/21 
0 0 0 0 9
41/57
0 0 0 0 10
44/53
10
Capital Fund 0 0 9 
19/40 
1
22/60
0 0 12
21/21
1
12/12
0 0 23
19/30
48
Restitution 
Fund 
0 1 
10/23 
0 0 0 0 0 3
26/27
0 0 4
22/26
25
Development 
Fund 
0 1 
35/20 
5 
35/35 
2
51/26
0 0 0 0 0 0 8
39/31
100
State 1 
70/64 
0 2 
55/65 
1
20/27
0 0 0 2
24/25
0 8 
66/59 
14
56/53
43
Total 8 
46/43 
10 
20/27 
48 
33/47 
38
31/35
4
22/35
12
36/56
13
21/21
7
23/22
0 10 
55/55 
150
32/40
33
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Table 15.  Determinants of Ownership Structure, Slovenia.  
Binary Logits. 
  1998 2002 
 Employee vs. Outsider Employee vs. Outsider 
LnK/Lt-1 
Fixed capital per labor 
-0.26 
(0.35 ) 
0.49* 
( 0.27) 
LnEmployees t-1 
number of employees 
-0.48 
( 0.36) 
-0.53** 
( 0.26) 
Average Labor Costs 
 
0.49 
( 0.80) 
1.31** 
( 0.60) 
LnLaborProd t-1 
Laborproductivity (sales per labor)  
-0.34 
(0.28) 
-0.24 
(0.20 ) 
Constant 
 
6.0 
(8.06 ) 
-12.5** 
( 5.8) 
Industry  yes yes 
Number of observations 86 119 
. 
1998-2002 
Change from Em-
ployees to Outsider 
vs Continuing Em-
ployee Ownership  
Change from Em-
ployees to Outsider 
vs Continuing  Out-
sider Ownership 
Continuing       Em-
ployee vs. Continu-
ing Outsider 
 
LnK/Lt-1  
Fixed capital per labour 
-14.7*** 
(0.41) 
-0.16 
(0.26) 
0.70*** 
(0.26) 
LnEmployees t-1 
number of employees 
0.51** 
(0.23) 
-0.12 
(0.27) 
-0.34 
(0.25) 
Average Labour Costs 
 
1.39* 
(0.74) 
-0.0013 
(0.65) 
0.27 
(0.68) 
LnLaborProd t-1 
Sales per labor  
0.44** 
(0.2) 
-0.32 
(0.25) 
-0.48** 
(0.20) 
Growth in 
Fixed capital per labor 
-3.95 
(2.75) 
-1.21 
(1.14) 
0.59 
(0.78) 
Growth Employment 
 
-5.87* 
(3.24) 
-2.20 
(1.45) 
-0.59 
(1.16) 
Growth in Average          
Labour Cost 
2.6 
(1.99) 
1.15 
(0.94) 
0.43 
(0.67) 
Growth 
Labour Productivity 
-2.23 
(1.43) 
-1.19 
(0.79) 
-0.98** 
(0.42) 
Constant 
 
-4.41 
(5.06) 
2.43 
(6.8) 
-3.32 
(6.28) 
Industry  Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummy yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 154 243 331 
*** significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%.  Robust standard errors in brackets.  
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Endnotes 
                                                          
1 This research is supported by a grant to the Institute for Southeast Europe, Slovenia; REB-
Monitoring (Russian Economic Barometer), Russia; Center for East European Studies, Denmark, 
from USAID's SEGIR EP Contract No.220/001.0-03-354, reference Russia task order no. 803, Im-
provement of Economic Policy Through Think Tank Partnership Project, administered by IRIS. The 
findings expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 
U.S. Agency for International Development. 
 
2 Gross intensity of redistribution in t-th year = 1/N Σdj(t), (j=1…N), where dj(t) is intensity of re-
distribution of j-th company in t-th year.  dj (t)= ½ Σ| shij(t)-shij(t-2)|,  (i=1,...6),  where shij (t)– 
share of i-th group in j-th company in t-th year. 
 
3  Because of the lack of reliability of profitability data REB uses three rough categories: 1 loss 
making, 2 balancing losses and profits and 3 profit making. 
 
4 Capital intensity is measured as fixed capital or equity capital per employee, and performance is 
sales per employee or ROA (both sets are strongly correlated), while wage measured as labor costs 
per employee and number of employees are included in all specification. We have used both OLS, 
Random Effects and Fixed Effects, and tested for the preferable method in given specifications.  
 
5 In a Fixed Effects model with the level and change in fixed capital per labor, employment, average 
cost per labor and ROA as explanatory variables we find a strong negative effect of the wage level 
on 1 % level. The Hausman test with 1% significance prefers the Fixed Effects to Random Effects 
model. The latter also has a negative effect for wage level, but in this case it is not significant. In 
the OLS version of this variable-specification again wage is negatively related to concentration, but 
not significant. However, here we have a negative relation to wage growth significant at the 10 % 
level. 
 
6 In fact, the mean for both fixed capital and equity per employee is the highest for the group of em-
ployee owned firms compared with all other subgroups including foreign and financial outsiders. 
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